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European Journal of Operational Research (2012This paper attempts to estimate trends in the efﬁciency levels of Indian and Pakistani commercial banks
between 1985 and 2003, a time period which encompasses two phases of signiﬁcant change to the reg-
ulation of the ﬁnancial sector in both countries. Our efﬁciency estimates show that, during the initial
years of the post reform period, a reduction in efﬁciency is observed for banks in both countries. However,
efﬁciency levels were found to have increased subsequently, suggesting a period of initial adjustment
throughout much of the 1990s followed by a subsequent correction in the latter part of the sample
period.
 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.‘‘One of the major objectives of banking sector reforms has been
to enhance efﬁciency and productivity through competition.’’
Address by Dr. Y.V. Reddy, Governor, Reserve Bank of India, at
the Institute of Bankers of Pakistan, Karachi, on May 18, 2005.
‘‘Far reaching reforms have resulted in a more efﬁcient and
competitive ﬁnancial system.’’
A Joint IMF-World Bank Mission report on banking reforms in
Pakistan.1. Introduction
The measurement of efﬁciency has become increasingly popular
topic in the economics literature. A signiﬁcant body of work has
developed that seeks to estimate the rate at which particular ﬁrms
are able to produce a given quantity of output conditional upon a
quantity of inputs relative to other ﬁrms in the same industry
and during the same time period. Some of the more prominent
examples of industries that have been subjected to such scrutiny
would be the banking sectors of a range of economies around the
world. Due to data availability, a majority of such effort has been
concentrated on banks operating in developed nations. However,
in recent years, studies on efﬁciency in developing countries bank-
ing sectors have also started to appear in publication in signiﬁcantll rights reserved.
x: +44 23 9284 4037.
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), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolumes, the result of which being of great interest due to the piv-
otal role that the banking sector can play in the evolution of a
developing economy. The contribution of this paper to this emer-
gent body of literature is to more formally investigate temporal
patterns in efﬁciency levels observed within the banking sectors
of India and Pakistan following an extensive program of legal and
regulatory reform enacted within the Indian Sub-Continent during
the 1990s. We use bootstrapped data envelopment analysis and a
subsequent second stage regression in order to make a comparison
of temporal patterns in efﬁciency levels between India and Paki-
stan. Such a comparison of banks from both countries in this regard
is important, as we are analysing two countries that have experi-
enced similar trends in economic performance where both enacted
programmes of major reform to their respective ﬁnancial sectors at
around the same time (Howcroft and Ataullah, 2006). It is there-
fore critical to observe whether banks in both countries responded
in the same way to these changes, or if there was a heterogeneous
response across countries to the reforms. Contrary to a signiﬁcant
number of other cross country studies of efﬁciency following a per-
iod of reform, Pakistan and India share a host of commonalities
such as stage of development, language, culture, and banking
structure. Hence, a comparison of efﬁciency across years and coun-
tries is less likely to suffer from problems relating to country het-
erogeneity. The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents
an overview of the Indian and Pakistani banking industries, while
a summary of efﬁciency and productivity studies is discussed in
Section 3. Section 4 provides conceptual framework and methodol-
ogy while Section 5 explains the data and Section 6 discusses
empirical results followed by a summary and conclusion.to regulatory reforms: The case of Indian and Pakistani commercial banks.
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Table 1
Timeline of Major Financial Reforms in India and Pakistan.
Timeline Pakistan India
1985–1988 – Chakravarty Committee report on coupon rates of govern-
ment bonds
– 182-day T-bills issued
– Commercial papers and CD issued
– Minimum lending rate (MLR) introduced leading the banks
to set interest rate more freely
– Discount and Financial House of India established to provide
the liquidity in the ﬁnancial market
1990 – Amendment in the Banks (Nationalisation Act) Act 1974. A homework for pri-
vatisation of nationalised banks
– Setting up Credit Information Bureau within the SBP for data collection of bor-
rowers to be used in creditworthiness by banks
1991 – Privatisation of two state owned public sector banks
– Licence given for opening up of 10 private domestic and three foreign banks
– Creation of National Credit Commission (NCC) to review the ﬂow of credit
allocation
– Narasimham Committee report on banking condition in
India with recommendation
1992 – Restructuring of SBP banking supervision department and given more power to
monitor the performance of banks
– SBP issued prudential regulation framework
– MLR increased to 19% in 1992
– Banks given autonomy to rationalise branches network
– RBI recapitalised the public sector banks by injecting INRs 40
billion
1993 – SBP given power to devise strategies to recover bad loans – MLR lowered to 17%
– Issuing of guideline to establish new private sector banks
– RBI issued guideline on income recognition, assets classiﬁca-
tion and provisioning
– Amendment in State Bank of India Act of 1955 to promote
partial private shareholding in banking
1994 – SBP granted autonomy through changes in legislation – MLR lowered
– Passing of legislation to recover bad debt
1995 – SBP made mandatory for all non-banking ﬁnancial institutions (NBFIs) to be
rated by an independent company approved by the bank
– SBP put moratorium on new banks licensing
– Banks allowed to set ﬁx term deposits freely of a maturity of
over two years
1996 – New private banks allowed to open rural branches
– Guideline issued to set up new Local Area Banks (LABs) in
private sector
– Banks given power to open/close branches
– Banks given instruction to follow minimum capital require-
ment for foreign exchange exposure
1997 – Further strengthening of SBP autonomy
– Commercial banks given power to offer investment-banking service through
separate subsidiary
– Pakistan banking council (a regulatory authority) dissolved
– SBP issued instruction to commercial banks in the country to follow Interna-
tional Accounting Standard (IAS) in presentation of their annual accounts
– SBP asked to comply the Risk Weighted Capital standard set by Basle commit-
tee and minimum capital raised, which brought a wave of mergers in subse-
quent years
– Reduction in SLR
– Introduction of ﬂexible term deposit rates
1998 – SBP recapitalised two public sector banks (PKRs 21 billion in UBL and 9.7 billion
in HBL)
– Autonomy given to public sector banks with respect to
branch expansion, recruitment of new staff and new capital
expenditure
– RBI deregulated the deposit market more by removing its
rates linkage with bank rate
1999 – Public sector banks given powers to rationalise branches and reduce manpower
2000 – SBP extended the mandatory rating to all commercial banks operating in the
country
– Increase in minimum capital requirements
– Establishment of Corporate and Industrial Restructuring Corporation (CIRC) to
revive sick industrial units and to take over non-performing loans of commer-
cial banks
– RBI advised banks to disclose the details of the maturity pro-
ﬁle of deposits, borrowing, loans, investment and
provisioning
– Implementation of CAMEL framework for performance
evaluation
2001 – Foreign banks allowed opening up to 25 branches in the country and this limit
has been raised to 50 in 2004
2 S. Jaffry et al. / European Journal of Operational Research xxx (2012) xxx–xxx2. Indian and Pakistani banking industries – an overview
Until the mid-1960s, the banking industries of India and Paki-
stan enjoyed an environment that was more conducive to compe-
tition. Entry and exit was relatively free and banks were able to set
their own interest rates without any signiﬁcant interference by the
government or state regulators. However, the second half of the
1960s and the ﬁrst half of the 1970s ushered a reversal of such pol-
icy, where commercial banks in both countries were nationalised
as a part of a move towards broader public ownership. Strict con-
trols on the opening and closing of branches in both countries hadPlease cite this article in press as: Jaffry, S., et al. Trends in efﬁciency in response
European Journal of Operational Research (2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econtributed to a situation where a large number of public sector
banks continued to operate with branches that were not econom-
ically viable and were concentrated in areas with large political
rents and less competition from the rival banks. However, in the
last few years, there have seen signiﬁcant changes in the way
banks are managed and regulated in both countries. In India, the
ﬁrst signiﬁcant ‘wave’ of reform began in 1992, under the con-
gress-led government of Narasimha Rao, which was followed by
a second ‘wave’ enacted during the politically unstable era of coali-
tions in the late 1990s. These changes to the regulation of the
Indian banking sector have involved a signiﬁcant transfer ofto regulatory reforms: The case of Indian and Pakistani commercial banks.
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sector banks greater levels of autonomy over operational decision
making. Table 1 contains a summary of the major reforms enacted
in this regard.
In Pakistan, a series of reforms were introduced by the civilian
governments of both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif (see Table 1
and Ul-Haque and Kardar (1995) and State Bank of Pakistan (2003)
for details of these reforms). The major focus of these changes was
to promote better use of resources by banks, which should have
resultantly brought about improvements in efﬁciency levels. Ta-
ble 2 contains the immediate response by the ﬁnancial sectors of
both India and Pakistan to the reforms in terms of the volume of
deposits mobilised, proﬁtability and private credits issued, mea-
sured in terms of the total assets of the three largest banks over
time. The observable trend is that activity in the ﬁnancial sector
has been increasing in both countries following the process of re-
form, with a higher value of deposits taken and a greater degree
of private credit (both relative to GDP) observed from the begin-
ning of the 1990s.2 To calculate DEA efﬁciency estimates we follow the seminal work of Farrell
(1957) as well as the input distance function proposed by Shephard (1970). Refer to
these papers for a more detailed explanation of the calculation of efﬁciency estimates
using DEA.
3 Treating a large number of banking services as outputs creates the curse of3. Review of literature
This paper is by no means the ﬁrst to focus on a comparison of
efﬁciency in both a pre and post reform period.1 There have been a
number of studies concerned speciﬁcally with the effect of regula-
tory reform upon the performance of the banking industry in devel-
oped economies (see Battese et al. (2000) [Sweden], Heshmati
(2001) [Sweden], Canhoto and Dermine (2003) [Portugal], Berger
and Humphrey (1997) [International], Baur et al. (1993) [USA], Hum-
phrey (1993), Berger and Mester (1997), and Berger and Mester
(2003) [USA], Humphrey and Pulley (1997) [USA], Alam (2001)
[USA], Berg et al. (1992) [Norway], Khumbhakar et al. (2001) [Spain]
for a selection of examples).
Studies analysing the effect of reforms on developing countries
have been somewhat less prevalent: however this is now starting
to change. The ﬁrst comprehensive study to look into the effect
of reforms within the Indian banking sector using a DEA method-
ology is by Bhattacharyya et al. (1997), who analyse the ‘early re-
form period’ between 1986 and 1991 and conclude that public
sector banks were more efﬁcient compared to private and foreign
banks. This is a broad conclusion shared by a number of subse-
quent studies, including Saha and Ravisankar (2000), Mukherjee
et al. (2002), Sathye (2003), and Das and Gosh (2006), as well as
a range of unpublished articles or working papers on the Indian
and Pakistani banking sectors by authors such as Das et al.
(2004), Qayyum and Khan (2007), Burki and Niazi (2003), Ul-Ha-
que (1997), and Saeed and Burki (2005). Other related studies that
have used stochastic frontier analysis have demonstrated conclu-
sions that were consistent with those emerging from the DEA
based literature (see Iimi (2004), Shanmugam and Das (2004), Patti
and Hardy (2005), and Sensarma (2006) for examples). There have
also been a limited number of recent studies seeking to make di-
rect comparisons of the response of both India and Pakistan to
the reform process. Papers by Howcroft and Ataullah (2006) and
Jaffry et al. (2007) broadly agree that the banking sectors of both
countries showed improvement in efﬁciency levels following the
reforms.dimensionality in a DEA framework, which pushes the efﬁciency scores upward and,
as a consequence, banks producing more and more services are seen to become more
efﬁcient. Bootstrapped bias corrected efﬁciency estimates are robust to the dimen-
sionality issue. Similar to Gilbert et al. (2004) and Simar and Wilson (2000a) we
checked the mean square error by calculating the ratio as 1/ times the product of
square of the bootstrap bias estimates divided by the sample variance of the bootstrap4. Methodology
The last two decades have witnessed an ever-growing volume
of literature on post deregulation performance analysis of ﬁnancial1 For a comprehensive review of the literature on the size and scope of
liberalisation see (Fanelli and Medhora, 1998).
Please cite this article in press as: Jaffry, S., et al. Trends in efﬁciency in response
European Journal of Operational Research (2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.einstitutions through productivity and efﬁciency, inspired by the
pivotal early work conducted by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen
and van den Broeck (1977) on the subject of efﬁciency. The linear
programming based technique of data envelopment analysis (DEA)
is a common means by which to estimate the efﬁciency frontier.2
However, Simar and Wilson (2000b) argue that the consistency of
the DEA estimator, which is an important property, is compromised
when more than one output and input is used and the number of
observations must increase to maintain mean-square error with
the nonparametric estimators of the constrained efﬁciency set. Sim-
ilarly, one must know the sampling distribution of the estimator in
order to make inferences about the true level of efﬁciency/inefﬁ-
ciency. Once known, the asymptotic value of the DEA estimators
can be used to correct the bias of the estimator. Asymptotic variance
and conﬁdence intervals similarly can be used to form an opinion
about the sampling variability of the estimator. Asymptotic proper-
ties require a large sample and the curse of dimensionality still ap-
plies to the estimator. Simar and Wilson (2000b) argued that a
bootstrap (Efron, 1979, 1982) is the next best possible way when
inferences are required for the DEA estimator. Since the DEA estima-
tor is biased by its construction, Simar and Wilson (1998) developed
an algorithm to approximate the sampling distribution of
h^DEAðx; yÞ  hðx; yÞ where bias is calculated and deducted from esti-
mated efﬁciencies. Bias in the estimator is approximated as:BIASðh^DEAðx0; y0ÞÞ ¼ Eðh^DEAðx0; y0ÞÞ  hðx0; y0Þ ð1Þ
As the bootstrap bias estimate for the original estimator
h^DEAðx0; y0Þ is the empirical analogue of the above, then the boot-
strap bias is calculated as:BIASBðh^DEAðx0; y0ÞÞ ¼ B1
XB
b¼1
h^DEA;Bðx0; y0Þ  h^DEAðx0; y0Þ ð2Þ
And the bias corrected estimator of h(x0,y0) is calculated as:^^hDEAðx0; y0Þ ¼ h^DEAðx0; y0Þ  BIASBðh^DEAðx0; y0ÞÞ
¼ 2h^DEAðx0; y0Þ  B1
XB
B¼1
h^DEA;bðx0; y0Þ ð3Þ
In this paper, we follow the above mechanism and use the input
oriented DEA estimator with its statistical inference developed by
Wilson (2008) to test for differences in efﬁciency across Indian and
Pakistani banks over the sample period. Homogeneous bootstrap
methodologies are used for this approximation of the asymptotic
distribution of distance function estimators where more than one
input or output is used to compile the production set, from which
the true distance function can be inferred.3 In the empirical section
of this paper, we report bias-corrected estimates of the input dis-
tance function by subtracting potentially noisy estimates of bias
from the original distance function estimates. In common with aestimates. If the mean squared error of bootstrapped estimates is worsened, then this
ratio should be less than unity and bias corrected estimates should not be used. In our
case this ratio is greater than unity (98% for Pakistani data and 100% for Indian data).
Hence in subsequent analysis we use bias corrected input distance function estimates.
to regulatory reforms: The case of Indian and Pakistani commercial banks.
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Table 2
Main features of Indian and Pakistani banking industries. Source: Authors compilation from various sources.
India Pakistan
1985 1991 1997 2003 1985 1991 1997 2003
Market
Number of banks 79 74 100 93 19 36 46 40
Number of branches 40,574 46,396 49,641 52,392 6748 7549 7039 6916
Herﬁndhal Index (Assets) 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.20
Share of top three banks (%) 40 41 36 35 81 71 53 49
Share of public banks 93 88 85 85 93 86 50 38
Banking deposits to GDP 0.31 0.32 0.35 0.50 0.26 0.23 0.33 0.39
Private credits to GDP 0.30 0.23 0.22 0.31 0.25 0.22 0.24 0.27
Prices
WA lending rate (%) 17.1 14.0 14.6 9.9 10.49 13.3 14.55 9.40
WA deposits rate (%) 10.1 7.50 7.80 6.40 5.76 6.00 6.80 2.09
Proﬁtability
ROA (%) 0.1 0.4 0.7 1.0 0.1 0.5 1.2 1.40
Asset auality
NPL as a % of advances 20.1 23.1 15.7 8.8 18.1 19.9 23.5 17.0
Liquidity
Loans to deposits (%) 67.8 60.4 55.0 56.9 52.1 54.1 55 57
Capitalisation
Equity to assets ratio (%) 1.5 2.5 6.5 5.5 3.1 3.7 4.5 8.5
4 S. Jaffry et al. / European Journal of Operational Research xxx (2012) xxx–xxxnumber of other studies, we use a range of input/output speciﬁca-
tions designed to measure the differences in levels of efﬁciency
across different types of banks for both countries.
To observe the inﬂuence of environmental variables on efﬁ-
ciency levels, the standard practice employed in the literature
has been to regress efﬁciency estimates on industry and ﬁrm-spe-
ciﬁc variables, as well as variables reﬂecting the macroeconomic
environment of the country. However, due to the potential for se-
rial correlation among estimated efﬁciencies, standard methods
such as Tobit regressions and panel data estimates may be inap-
propriate. Simar and Wilson (2007) provide a bootstrap procedure
based estimator, which improves the statistical efﬁciency of the
second stage regression. We have followed their approach and also
reported other commonly used estimators, such as panel data esti-
mators (pooled, within, GLS (generalised least squares) and Tobit),
for comparison. The results from this second stage regression can
be found in Section 6.2.5 Bhattacharyya et al. (1997) stated that treating deposits as outputs makes
intuitive sense in the context of Indian banking, as the main objective of bank
management post nationalisation has been deposit mobilisation, due to low saving
rates and issues associated with the availability of modes of savings. Further,
Sensarma (2006) argued that treating deposits as outputs can take into account the
quality of the services provided by banks.
6 Similar to deposits, the use of branches as outputs in the context of the banking
sectors of developing economies is somewhat controversial. After deregulation,
branch rationalisation was used as an important tool for cost cutting, but in some
cases branch expansion has been used to enhance the banking service provisions in
rural and semi-urban areas. Further, in case of government owned banks expansion/
rationalisation of branches has also been used as a tool to seek political rent in5. Data
Our data cover a period of nineteen years for both the Indian
and Pakistani banking sectors, which encompasses a signiﬁcant
portion of the pre and post reform period for both countries. To
our knowledge, this is unique amongst studies that have been con-
ducted into efﬁciency changes following regulatory reform in the
ﬁnancial sectors of Indian sub-continent. A systematic procedure
is used to rank observations in terms of their similarity and dissim-
ilarity to other observations in the data set, in an attempt to re-
move the inﬂuence of outlying observations from our DEA
efﬁciency estimates (as proposed by Wilson, 1993). The ﬁnal data
set is composed of 73 Indian banks (of which 27 are public, 23
are private and 23 are foreign) and 41 Pakistani banks (of which
six are public, 16 are private and 19 are foreign). For the purpose
of this study, the bank’s output levels are measured by (i) loans
(ii) investment in private and government securities (iii) time
deposits (iv) savings deposits (v) current deposits and (vi) number
of branches.4 Although there is a debate in the literature over the4 All monetary quantities were deﬂated by using the appropriate GDP deﬂator for
each country.
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of our DEA analysis, deposits are considered to be an output,5 with
inputs being measured by (i) number of employees, (ii) levels of
ﬁxed assets and (iii) capital and reserves. The use of branches as
an output is consistent with the approach adopted by the banking
literature (see Berger and Humphrey (1997) for a general explana-
tion, or Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003) who look speciﬁcally at
India).6
Although the selection of inputs appropriate to a typical bank is
the subject of lessdebate in theempirical research literaturewith re-
gard to efﬁciency measurement, the process is far from straightfor-
ward. Treating equity capital (capital and reserves) and ﬁxed assets
as variable inputs is relatively uncommon. Typically, equity and
ﬁxed assets are treated as quasi-ﬁxed inputs.We believe that equity
and ﬁxed assets measured over a long time period wherein banks in
the long run have the choice to alter the combinations in accordance
with prevailing market conditions and regulatory compliance
should be treated more carefully. In our case studies of Indian and
Pakistani banking industriesweareusingnineteenyears of data that
almost covers four business cycles (1985–1990, 1991–1996, 1997–
2000 and 2001–2003 as per GDP growth rates and overall economic
conditions) and implementation of capital adequacy standards fol-
lowing the Basle accords. Further, signiﬁcant investment in high-
tech procedures coupled with the introduction of ATM machines
in both Indian and Pakistani banking industries has made these
two inputs more of a choice rather than a ﬁxed factor on the partdeveloping countries and by not including branches would not include an important
output proxy and would be equal to penalising these banks. This was among the
number of reasons which led the study by Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003) to include
branches as an output.
to regulatory reforms: The case of Indian and Pakistani commercial banks.
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics of inputs and outputs.
India Pakistan
Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Employees (x1) 1293 12,421 26,333 12 239,649 564 605 1282 1 8300
Capital (x2) 1293 115 197 0 1929 564 3 7 0 33
Fixed assets (x3) 1293 506 1025 0 15,030 564 2442 4384 19 34,623
Time deposits (y1) 1293 4900 10,310 2 141,975 564 14,113 27,143 5 155,275
Saving deposits (y2) 1293 6071 14,296 0 308,895 564 17,712 34,343 7 184,848
Current deposits (y3) 1293 5711 10,927 1 170,029 564 9597 20,312 3 120,544
Loans (y4) 1293 2024 4360 0 71,708 564 25,139 47,031 21 246,000
Investment (y5) 1293 1412 3419 0 45,307 564 15,233 30,208 0 179,000
Branches (y6) 1293 655 1131 1 9071 564 233 515 1 1993
Notes: Real value ﬁgures except for branches and numbers of employees are in crores of Indian Rupees and thousands of Pakistani Rupees respectively, where
1 crore = 10 million. Inputs are shown by xi and outputs by yi Employees (x1) is total number of employees, capital (x2) is sum of capital and reserves, ﬁxed assets (x3) is banks
total ﬁxed assets, time deposits (y1), saving deposits (y2) and current deposits (y3) are core banking deposits, loans (y4) is total loans (consumer, industrial and other loans),
investment (y5) is total investment in bonds, securities, etc. (including government bonds, etc.), and branches (y6) is total number of branches. All monetary values are
deﬂated by GDP deﬂator.
S. Jaffry et al. / European Journal of Operational Research xxx (2012) xxx–xxx 5of each bank. In our empirical analysis, we experimented by drop-
ping this assumption: resultantly our broad conclusions remained
same in the case of ﬁxed assets but different for equity capital.
Descriptive statistics for the input and output variables for both In-
dian and Pakistani banks can be seen below in Table 3.
DEA efﬁciency scores are very sensitive to the choice of inputs
and outputs and, as such, we have employed a variety of different
speciﬁcations of inputs and outputs to test for consistency. Gilbert
et al. (2004) explain that one can treat variables as outputs after
the point where the addition of a new input variable is unable to
reduce estimated levels of inefﬁciency: hence the ﬁnal model cho-
sen for subsequent analysis is where inefﬁciency is minimised for
the banks included in the sample.9 Sensarma (2006), while discussing the modest performance of Indian foreign
banks argued that lack of efﬁciency arises for a variety of reasons. Foreign banks
usually recruit well-paid ofﬁcers compared to domestic private banks who may opt
for more modestly salaried clerical and subordinate staff in their overall workforce.
Foreign banks may operate through branch ofﬁces rather than full subsidiaries and
parent banks may put less effort into making these branch ofﬁces more efﬁcient. The6. Estimation and explanation
The variable returns to scale7 input distance function estimates
are provided in Appendix A for each bank in the ﬁnal year of the
sample period (2003). The third column in this table (labelled ‘Eff’)
provides original efﬁciency estimates based on input distance func-
tion, while the column labelled ‘Effcc’ provides the results from the
bias corrected input distance function estimates. The ﬁnal four col-
umns contain estimated upper and lower bounds conﬁdence inter-
vals at 5% (a0.05,b0.05) and 1% (a0.01,b0.01) signiﬁcance levels
respectively. These estimates, along with the corresponding stan-
dard deviations (sigma) imply a reasonable degree of a variation be-
tween the most and least efﬁcient banks, especially in Pakistan. The
data presented in this table implies that the least efﬁcient Indian
bank could have reduced the quantity of inputs employed to gener-
ate a given level of output by 39.06%8 whereas the most efﬁcient
could feasibly have reduced input quantities by 3.10% in the ﬁnal
year of the sample. For Pakistan, these numbers indicate a potential
reduction in quantity of inputs used equal to 58.37% and 12.05%
respectively. These estimates are broadly in line with other studies
that have estimated efﬁciency scores for Indian and Pakistani banks.
When banks are differentiated according to their ownership,
further insights are made possible. For Indian banks, the average
potential input reductions in the ﬁnal year of the sample period
(2003) are estimated to be 16.94%, 9.91% and 7.31% for foreign,7 Although we present variable returns to scale efﬁciency estimates here but we
also estimated our models with constant and non-increasing returns to scale
assumptions. These estimates are available from the authors upon request. The
broad conclusions arrived at, however, remain the same.
8 This is calculated as (1  [1/n]  100), where n represents the bias corrected input
distance function efﬁciency estimate for any given bank, as seen in the ‘effc’ column of
Appendix A.
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ﬁgures are 27.11%, 26.91% and 14.38% for foreign, private and pub-
lic sector banks.96.1. Investigating temporal patterns in efﬁciency estimates and
variance
The mean input distance function estimates for the entire
sample are shown graphically for the ﬁnal model speciﬁcation, as
well as the four alternate models with different input and output
speciﬁcations in Fig. 1a and b, below. The trends in input distance
estimates remain consistent between speciﬁcations – the exclu-
sion/inclusion of different inputs and outputs merely serves to shift
the curve vertically.
For India, it is observed that banks operated with some level of
inefﬁciency before the ﬁrst reforms occurred in 1992. It can also be
seen that an upturn in efﬁciency was experienced from the late
1990s onwards. In the ﬁrst few years of the reform period, banks
invested heavily in infrastructure, such as buildings and technol-
ogy (including the purchase of both software and hardware) and
returns from these investments materialised later. The efﬁciency
decline in the ﬁrst few years following reform can be explained
in part due to the stringent requirements of asset classiﬁcation, in-
come recognition and provisioning guidelines (Saha and Ravisan-
kar, 2000). Improved performance in the latter years of the
sample period is partly due to the above average performance of
public sector banks. Bhaumik and Dimova (2004) argued that pub-
lic sector banks have managed to bridge the difference with private
banks in the post reform period – hence the inﬂuence of competi-
tion seems to be more important compared with ownership per se.
Pakistan’s temporal pattern of efﬁciency change shown in Fig. 1
has been more erratic than that observed in India, although similar
general trends can be observed.fact that these foreign branch ofﬁces are not listed on Indian stock exchanges could be
considered to create less in the way of pressure from the market to perform well.
Bhattacharyya et al. (1997) argued that the better performance of foreign banks in the
late 1980s can be partly be explained due to Non Resident Indians (NRIs) using these
banks to keep deposits at higher interest rates and send remittances through the
network of these global banks with better and more reliable service provision.
However, a huge investment by domestic private and public sector banks in
technology and customer service may have closed the service quality gap between
foreign and domestic banks in the post reform period.
to regulatory reforms: The case of Indian and Pakistani commercial banks.
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Fig. 1. (a) Mean efﬁciency estimates of Indian banks. (b) Mean efﬁciency estimates of Pakistani banks.
6 S. Jaffry et al. / European Journal of Operational Research xxx (2012) xxx–xxxPakistani banks seem to have displayed decreasing levels of efﬁ-
ciency from the late 1980s up until the mid 1990s, where a very
slight reduction in distance from the frontier is subsequently ob-
served during most years of the sample period. A reversal in efﬁ-
ciency declines can be explained as a result of improving
economic conditions after 1999 (the only years to demonstrate
an exception to this trend are 1997 and 1998, dates corresponding
to the Asian ﬁnancial crisis). The improvement in efﬁciency
observed from the late 1990s is not of the same magnitude as that
observed for Indian banks.
Iimi (2003) concluded that, for Pakistani banks after 1999, dif-
ferentials in efﬁciency levels increased due to the fact that some
banks had opted for extensive internal restructuring compared
with other banks. The higher dispersion in efﬁciency between
1998 and 2002 is consistent with the intuition that the liberalisa-
tion of interest rates and credit ceilings combined with consider-
able macroeconomic volatility gave room for vastly different
portfolio choices compared to the cluster of portfolios by Pakistani
banks in the pre reform period (Patti and Hardy, 2005). The overallPlease cite this article in press as: Jaffry, S., et al. Trends in efﬁciency in response
European Journal of Operational Research (2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.emessage coming out of these average input distance function esti-
mates is that for both India and Pakistan, in the period immedi-
ately following regulatory reform, efﬁciency levels worsened
(which Ataullah et al. (2004) also ﬁnd), but then subsequently im-
proved during the second reform period. These are conclusions
that are also shared by other studies on Indian banks (see, Galage-
dera and Edirisuriya (2004), Mohan and Ray (2004), Reddy (2005),
Zhao et al. (2006), and Mahesh and Rajeeve (2006) for examples).
6.2. Second stage estimation: factors explaining efﬁciency estimates
Table 4 displays the full listing of variables used to construct the
second stage regression model, as well as the results. A number of
different model speciﬁcation are used to regress distance function
estimates (and hence, inversely, efﬁciency levels) against a number
of explanatory factors listed below. Due to multiple observations
for each bank in the sample, robust standard errors are calculated.
Further, due to endogeneity of operating expenditure ratio and in
the presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in theto regulatory reforms: The case of Indian and Pakistani commercial banks.
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Table 4
Second stage panel data regression estimates.
Variables India Pakistan
Pooleda Withinb GLSc Tobitd Simare Pooleda Withinb GLSc Tobite Simare
Internal operational variables
b 0.02 0.002 0.184⁄⁄⁄ 0.625⁄⁄⁄ 0.073 0.251⁄⁄ 0.499⁄⁄⁄ 0.144⁄⁄⁄ 0.185⁄⁄⁄ 0.675
e 6.617⁄⁄⁄ 9.053⁄⁄⁄ 7.125⁄⁄⁄ 8.258⁄⁄⁄ 1.147⁄⁄ 7.162⁄⁄⁄ 5.044⁄⁄⁄ 2.792⁄⁄⁄ 5.870⁄⁄⁄ 16.821⁄⁄⁄
d 1.815⁄⁄⁄ 3.540⁄⁄⁄ 0.739⁄⁄⁄ 2.776⁄⁄⁄ 0.581 0.06 0.019 0.125 0.159 0.264
roa 0.716 1.627⁄⁄ 0.372 1.408⁄ 3.763⁄⁄⁄ 0.368 0.016 0.122 0.06 1.092⁄⁄
td 1.502⁄⁄⁄ 1.467⁄⁄⁄ 0.444⁄⁄⁄ 1.312⁄⁄⁄ 0.11 0.645⁄⁄ 0.122 0.285⁄⁄⁄ 0.023 1.883⁄⁄
ia 0.044 0.199 0.238⁄⁄⁄ 0.208⁄ 0.543⁄⁄⁄ 0.457 0.495⁄⁄⁄ 0.333⁄⁄⁄ 0.434⁄⁄ 1.334⁄⁄⁄
ds 0.127⁄⁄⁄ 0.587⁄⁄⁄ 0.096⁄⁄⁄ 0.424⁄⁄⁄ 0.005 0.102 0.053 0.059⁄ 0.083⁄⁄ 0.234
oexp 0.266 0.036 0.074 0.163 1.718 0.516⁄ 0.560⁄⁄ 0.111 0.540⁄⁄⁄ 0.687
e2 9.785⁄⁄ 15.482⁄⁄⁄ 15.189⁄⁄⁄ 13.699⁄⁄⁄ 17.003⁄⁄⁄ 12.640⁄⁄ 7.820⁄⁄⁄ 2.487 9.050⁄⁄⁄ 32.122⁄⁄⁄
cd 1.135⁄ 1.288⁄⁄⁄ 0.390⁄ 0.870⁄⁄⁄ 0.393⁄⁄⁄ 0.516b⁄ 0.364⁄⁄ 0.081 0.248⁄ 1.478⁄⁄⁄
Macroeconomic variables
gdp 0.013⁄⁄ 0.011⁄ 0.001 0.012⁄ 0.04 0.013 0.006 0.010⁄⁄ 0.008 0.018
inf 0.004 0.008⁄ 0.004⁄⁄ 0.008⁄ 0.009 0.012 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.044
Variables reﬂecting competitive environment
h 2.564 4.2 2.944⁄ 3.563 5.457 5.615⁄ 3.606 0.947 5.726⁄ 4.804
h2 12.059 27.367 19.444 21.036 23.627⁄⁄⁄ 9.022 6.218 2.322 10.526⁄ 16.503⁄⁄⁄
Time dummies
d9397 0.02 0.045 0.011 0.031 0.177 0.263⁄⁄ 0.171⁄ 0.071⁄ 0.193⁄ 0.244
d9803 0.118 0.003 0.057⁄⁄ 0.031 0.024 0.192 0.153 0.026 0.159 0.294⁄⁄
Supplementary information
Constant 1.597⁄ 0.174 0.645⁄⁄⁄ 0.031 0.108 0.904⁄ 1.189⁄⁄⁄ 0.136
N 1293 1293 1293 1293 1293 564 564 564 564 564
Explanatory Variables deﬁnition: e: Equity to asset ratio, b: Log of branches, d: Log of diversiﬁcation index, roa: Proﬁtability: Return on assets, td: Time deposits to total
deposit ratio, ia: Investment to assets ratio, ds: Diversiﬁcation  size (assets), oexp: Operating expenses to total expenses, cd: Current deposits to total deposits, e2: Equity to
asset ratio (square), gdp: Macroeconomic: GDP growth rate, inf: Macroeconomic: Inﬂation rate, h: Herﬁndhal Index.
a Robust standard error estimates, 2.
b Instrumental within effect estimator (oexp instrumented by call money rate, log of total assets, yearly dummies, td, sd,cd, dummies for public and foreign ownerships.
Instruments were selected based on their theoretical relevance and literature).
c Heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent iterated feasible generalised least square (FGLS) estimates.
d Random effect tobit estimates (with truncation limit 1 imposed).
e Simar and Wilson (2007) estimator.
⁄ p < 0.05.
⁄⁄ p < 0.01.
⁄⁄⁄ p < 0.001.
12 This negative relation between efﬁciency and capital though not expected, but
nonetheless found in earlier studies. Hughes and Mester (1998, 2009), Berger and De
Young (1997), Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997), Williams (2004), and Altunbas et al. (2007)
argued that both capital and risk are likely to be determined by the level of bank
efﬁciency. Contrary to other studies, Altunbas et al. (2007), however, found a negative
S. Jaffry et al. / European Journal of Operational Research xxx (2012) xxx–xxx 7panel, we used instrumental variable between effect and iterated
feasible generalised least square estimator in regard to the effect
of different explanatory variables on the biased corrected efﬁ-
ciency estimates.
The results indicate that, for both countries, banks that have in-
creased numbers of branches, investment to assets ratios, squared
equity to assets ratios and squared Herﬁndhal indices display high-
er levels of efﬁciency, while higher equity to assets ratios are asso-
ciated with lower levels of efﬁciency A negative relationship is
observed for diversiﬁcation,10 time deposits to total deposits ratio,
current deposits to total deposits ratio and inﬂation variables of In-
dian banks, while a positive relationship is observed for Pakistani
banks.11 The opposite is true with respect to the diversiﬁcation  size
variable, where the coefﬁcient suggests a positive relationship with
efﬁciency in India and a negative relationship in Pakistan. These re-
sults indicate that banks which have larger branch networks, have10 We followed Aly et al. (1990) to calculate a measure of product diversity (D) as:
D ¼  lnPni¼1Si2 where ln is a natural log, Si is the proportion of a bank’s total loans/
deposits accounted by the ith product. Generally, this index is generated by
calculating the contribution of different income or sales to the total income of the
bank. Due to the nature of the banking system for developing countries, where 90% of
revenue is earned through lending business; we calculated the total business by
summing up loans and deposits business and then the calculated share of each ones’
contribution. This index can take a very low value for a single product bank and
increases in value when more products are offered.
11 Burki and Niazi (2003), in regressing allocative efﬁciencies in Pakistani banking
on a set of variables observed a positive relationship for assets, negative for branches
and positive for liquid assets/total assets.
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in a more competitive environment will display the highest levels
of efﬁciency, while those that have a greater proportion of equity
in their total assets display lower levels.12
Also of note would be the time dummies used to represent the
ﬁrst and second waves of reform, which add weight to the argu-
ment that the reform process of the early to mid 1990s seems to
have had a negative effect on efﬁciency (particularly in Pakistan),
while the second wave of reform from 1998 onwards has had arelationship between efﬁciency and bank capital. They argued that supervisory
authorities are likely to be more ﬂexible in terms of their capital leverage with more
efﬁcient banks. On the contrary, a less efﬁcient bank is likely to take on higher risk
with low capital to compensate for lost returns due to moral hazard. But this positive
relationship between higher capita/asset ratio to efﬁciency is re-established at a quite
higher level of bank capitalisation (e2). The number of branches indicates size and the
increase in efﬁciency due to the large number of branches, which could be an
indication of scale economies. Higher investment to asset ratio could be a proxy for
management ability to expand the business to non-traditional business. Interestingly,
market concentration measured by the Herﬁndhal index points to a structure conduct
performance (i.e. more concentration, less efﬁcient) framework..However, the rela-
tionship is not signiﬁcant across different estimators. Similarly, a non-linear
relationship between concentration and efﬁciency is also not signiﬁcant across
different estimators but nonetheless consistently points to a relative efﬁciency model
at a very high level of concentration.
to regulatory reforms: The case of Indian and Pakistani commercial banks.
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8 S. Jaffry et al. / European Journal of Operational Research xxx (2012) xxx–xxxpositive effect. This is consistent with the adjustment/correction
results outlined above.
7. Conclusion
This paper has attempted to estimate an input distance function
for Indian and Pakistani banks over the period between 1985 and
2003 using methodologies described by Simar and Wilson
(2000b), Wilson (2008), and Gilbert et al. (2004). The sample period
is characterised by signiﬁcant changes to the regulatory environ-
ment in the Indian Sub-Continent, with major changes brought
about in 1992 and 1998. It appears that the regulatory changes
introduced in 1992 have not initially had a desirable effect on the
efﬁciency of both Indian and Pakistani banks. However, it seems
that banks were slowly able to adapt to the new competitive envi-
ronment in the ﬁnal years of the 1990s, and continued to make efﬁ-
ciency improvements throughout the early part of the 21st Century.
This suggests a period of initial adjustment to the new regulatoryBank Type Eff Effc Bias
India
1 Public 1.859 1.068 0.068
2 Public 1.859 1.060 0.060
3 Public 1.043 1.075 0.032
4 Public 1.859 1.056 0.056
5 Public 1.859 1.042 0.042
6 Public 1.093 1.125 0.032
7 Public 1.859 1.065 0.065
8 Public 1.007 1.032 0.025
9 Public 1.859 1.048 0.048
10 Public 1.859 1.064 0.064
11 Public 1.859 1.048 0.048
12 Public 1.859 1.057 0.057
13 Public 1.859 1.070 0.070
14 Public 1.859 1.051 0.051
15 Public 1.402 1.442 0.040
16 Public 1.048 1.074 0.027
17 Public 1.002 1.032 0.030
18 Public 1.859 1.065 0.065
19 Public 1.859 1.063 0.063
20 Public 1.859 1.032 0.032
21 Public 1.859 1.069 0.069
22 Public 1.119 1.154 0.036
23 Public 1.076 1.104 0.029
24 Public 1.859 1.051 0.051
25 Public 1.859 1.061 0.061
26 Public 1.019 1.049 0.030
27 Public 1.859 1.071 0.071
28 Private 1.859 1.053 0.053
29 Private 1.859 1.068 0.068
30 Private 1.859 1.036 0.036
31 Private 1.859 1.063 0.063
32 Private 1.859 1.064 0.064
33 Private 1.859 1.060 0.060
34 Private 1.333 1.375 0.042
35 Private 1.090 1.123 0.032
37 Private 1.859 1.053 0.053
38 Private 1.289 1.323 0.034
39 Private 1.859 1.057 0.057
40 Private 1.859 1.060 0.060
41 Private 1.091 1.123 0.032
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the reforms, followed by a sharp correction towards the end of the
sample. In terms of policy implications, our results indicate that it
takes time for banks to adjust to reforms to the regulatory environ-
ment and that increased competition amongst banks is eventually
found to impact positively upon efﬁciency levels. Patience, there-
fore, is found to be a virtue in prudential banking regulation.
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Appendix A
A.1. Input distance function estimates (2003)Sigma a0.05 b0.05 a0.01 b0.01
0.007 1.002 1.335 1.000 1.370
0.004 1.001 1.220 1.000 1.308
0.001 1.044 1.155 1.043 1.257
0.003 1.002 1.198 1.000 1.220
0.001 1.002 1.140 1.001 1.173
0.001 1.095 1.214 1.093 1.304
0.005 1.001 1.242 1.000 1.298
0.000 1.009 1.073 1.008 1.086
0.002 1.001 1.149 1.000 1.215
0.005 1.002 1.259 1.000 1.323
0.002 1.001 1.163 1.000 1.230
0.003 1.002 1.191 1.000 1.270
0.008 1.001 1.334 1.000 1.372
0.002 1.001 1.154 1.000 1.177
0.001 1.404 1.520 1.403 1.601
0.000 1.050 1.109 1.048 1.124
0.001 1.004 1.098 1.002 1.138
0.006 1.001 1.288 1.000 1.320
0.005 1.002 1.238 1.000 1.275
0.001 1.002 1.092 1.000 1.134
0.008 1.001 1.335 1.000 1.368
0.001 1.120 1.231 1.118 1.253
0.000 1.077 1.142 1.075 1.157
0.002 1.001 1.162 1.000 1.187
0.004 1.002 1.211 1.000 1.230
0.000 1.021 1.102 1.020 1.134
0.008 1.002 1.330 1.000 1.375
0.003 1.002 1.184 1.000 1.228
0.007 1.001 1.287 1.000 1.319
0.001 1.002 1.099 1.000 1.127
0.005 1.002 1.226 1.000 1.243
0.005 1.002 1.232 1.000 1.255
0.004 1.002 1.218 1.000 1.245
0.001 1.335 1.488 1.333 1.528
0.001 1.092 1.223 1.090 1.261
0.003 1.002 1.182 1.000 1.252
0.000 1.291 1.373 1.289 1.397
0.003 1.002 1.178 1.000 1.189
0.005 1.001 1.233 1.000 1.253
0.000 1.093 1.169 1.092 1.189
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(continued)
Bank Type Eff Effc Bias Sigma a0.05 b0.05 a0.01 b0.01
42 Private 1.859 1.054 0.054 0.003 1.002 1.180 1.000 1.196
43 Private 1.114 1.149 0.035 0.001 1.117 1.203 1.115 1.225
46 Private 1.185 1.219 0.033 0.001 1.187 1.293 1.186 1.317
48 Private 1.859 1.059 0.059 0.004 1.002 1.218 1.000 1.314
49 Private 1.859 1.046 0.046 0.002 1.001 1.153 1.000 1.213
51 Foreign 1.859 1.069 0.069 0.008 1.002 1.340 1.000 1.374
53 Foreign 1.859 1.073 0.073 0.008 1.002 1.339 1.000 1.367
54 Foreign 1.336 1.375 0.039 0.001 1.338 1.448 1.336 1.496
55 Foreign 1.859 1.068 0.068 0.008 1.001 1.334 1.000 1.373
56 Foreign 1.859 1.046 0.046 0.002 1.002 1.142 1.000 1.238
57 Foreign 1.098 1.134 0.036 0.001 1.100 1.209 1.099 1.263
58 Foreign 1.859 1.069 0.069 0.008 1.002 1.321 1.000 1.362
60 Foreign 1.413 1.458 0.046 0.002 1.414 1.578 1.412 1.662
62 Foreign 1.589 1.641 0.052 0.003 1.591 1.774 1.589 1.958
63 Foreign 1.859 1.070 0.070 0.008 1.001 1.341 1.000 1.374
64 Foreign 1.525 1.576 0.051 0.002 1.527 1.741 1.525 1.798
65 Foreign 1.859 1.067 0.067 0.007 1.002 1.322 1.000 1.370
67 Foreign 1.859 1.070 0.070 0.008 1.001 1.339 1.000 1.375
68 Foreign 1.399 1.441 0.051 0.002 1.393 1.551 1.390 1.606
69 Foreign 1.140 1.176 0.036 0.001 1.142 1.283 1.141 1.396
70 Foreign 1.859 1.071 0.071 0.008 1.001 1.338 1.000 1.376
73 Foreign 1.859 1.072 0.072 0.008 1.002 1.343 1.000 1.374
Pakistan
1 Foreign 1.205 1.320 0.116 0.006 1.210 1.523 1.206 1.614
2 Foreign 1.859 1.167 0.167 0.016 1.007 1.415 1.001 1.468
3 Private 1.859 1.167 0.167 0.020 1.005 1.494 1.002 1.550
4 Foreign 2.169 2.402 0.233 0.024 2.184 2.804 2.171 2.939
6 Private 1.859 1.168 0.168 0.020 1.006 1.507 1.002 1.555
7 Private 1.859 1.158 0.158 0.013 1.006 1.377 1.001 1.425
8 Private 1.859 1.172 0.172 0.020 1.005 1.502 1.001 1.548
9 Foreign 1.284 1.412 0.128 0.007 1.292 1.605 1.285 1.691
11 Private 1.859 1.145 0.145 0.010 1.007 1.353 1.002 1.395
13 Private 1.859 1.171 0.171 0.020 1.006 1.501 1.001 1.539
14 Foreign 1.859 1.170 0.170 0.020 1.006 1.508 1.002 1.555
15 Private 1.886 2.058 0.172 0.012 1.899 2.342 1.887 2.430
17 Foreign 1.859 1.177 0.177 0.020 1.008 1.475 1.002 1.528
18 Foreign 1.451 1.600 0.149 0.011 1.460 1.855 1.453 1.972
21 Private 1.761 1.923 0.162 0.012 1.775 2.201 1.763 2.314
22 Public 1.859 1.164 0.164 0.019 1.006 1.483 1.002 1.515
23 Private 1.859 1.168 0.168 0.020 1.006 1.506 1.001 1.549
24 Public 1.859 1.172 0.172 0.021 1.007 1.503 1.001 1.551
25 Foreign 1.859 1.137 0.137 0.009 1.007 1.363 1.001 1.407
28 Private 1.859 1.147 0.147 0.010 1.006 1.371 1.001 1.421
29 Private 1.859 1.165 0.165 0.017 1.006 1.443 1.001 1.493
30 Public 1.859 1.167 0.167 0.020 1.005 1.502 1.001 1.541
31 Private 1.859 1.174 0.174 0.020 1.008 1.502 1.001 1.561
32 Private 1.696 1.858 0.162 0.011 1.705 2.095 1.697 2.120
33 Private 1.453 1.584 0.131 0.005 1.461 1.737 1.455 1.780
34 Private 1.486 1.614 0.127 0.005 1.496 1.762 1.488 1.814
35 Foreign 1.859 1.171 0.171 0.021 1.006 1.506 1.001 1.561
37 Private 1.519 1.649 0.131 0.005 1.527 1.798 1.520 1.865
38 Foreign 1.859 1.171 0.171 0.020 1.006 1.504 1.001 1.550
40 Private 1.859 1.141 0.141 0.009 1.007 1.309 1.001 1.331
41 Private 1.859 1.165 0.165 0.015 1.008 1.421 1.001 1.446
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